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Women Mobilizing Women: Candidates’ 
Strategies for Winning the Presidency 
Catherine Reyes-Housholder 
Abstract: Latin America has elected more female presidents than any 
other region in the world, yet dominant theories on campaigning tend to 
ignore gender. In addressing this lacuna, this article argues that the wide-
spread belief that women are better at mobilizing women means that 
female candidates tend to invest more significant effort into cultivating a 
core constituency of women on the basis of gender identity. In contrast, 
male candidates tend to delegate women-mobilization tasks to female 
surrogates. An analysis of approximately 1,000 newspaper articles reveals 
that the “most different” female candidates in Chile and Brazil consist-
ently met with female voters early in their campaigns, evoked gender 
identities and promised pro-women change. The “most different” male 
candidates enlisted their wives and female politicians to target women, 
defend their pro-women promises, and deflect accusations of sexism. 
The theory illuminates multiple ways in which viable female candidates’ 
entry into the political arena can improve women’s representation. 
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Introduction 
Despite its reputation for machismo and profound gender inequalities, 
Latin America leads the world in terms of democratically electing female 
presidents, having done so seven times since 2006.1 A broader, underly-
ing trend is that women are more often, and more competitively, running 
for the presidential office. Female candidates from ideologically diverse 
parties have made viable runs 29 times in all but four Latin American 
countries (Reyes-Housholder and Thomas 2018).2 Women are voting at 
similar, or even higher, rates as men (Desposato and Norrander 2009), 
and constitute a numerically large and electorally lucrative group. Why 
and how might female presidential candidates differ from male candi-
dates in targeting of the female constituency? 
It is intuitively plausible that female and male candidates will em-
ploy divergent strategies vis-à-vis female voters. Yet, dominant theories 
of Latin American campaigning are gender blind, with the conventional 
wisdom predicting that female and male candidates from the same party 
or country will adopt similar strategies (Boas 2016; Dix 1989; Luna 2014; 
Roberts 2015). Research from outside the region instead shows that 
gender stereotypes motivate women running for legislative and sub-
national posts to employ innovative mobilization tactics (Herrnson 2003; 
Herrnson and Lucas 2006; Kahn 1996).  
Studies looking at the impact of candidates’ gender identities on 
campaign strategies have not explored presidential elections in Latin 
America. Female voters in this region tend to disproportionately support 
female presidential candidates (Morgan 2015), but no study explains or 
shows exactly why this might be the case. We know little about what 
specific kinds of electioneering tactics female candidates may employ to 
attract female voters, how such tactics might differ from those used by 
their male competitors, and how these competitors may react.  
In addressing this lacuna, this article introduces a theory of gender-
strategic mobilization, which posits a prevalent belief that women are 
more effective than men at mobilizing female voters. I argue that this 
belief powerfully shapes the extent and ways in which presidential candi-
                                                 
1  I thank Jennifer Piscopo and Magda Hinojosa for their comments on earlier 
versions of this study. A 2015 Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship 
funded fieldwork in Brazil and Chile. Support was also provided by the Center 
for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies (COES)-Universidad Diego Portales 
through the CONICYT/FONDAP/15130009 grant. 
2  A viable candidacy here means the candidate won at least 15 percent in the first 
(or only) round of voting. 
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dates target women. Female candidates tend to invest early efforts in 
targeting a core constituency of women, specifically on the basis of gen-
der identity. Acting on the same belief, male candidates target women 
less overall on the basis of gender identity. However, when they do so, 
which is more likely to occur when they are campaigning against a wom-
an, they tend to delegate the task to female surrogates.  
I illustrate this theory with a series of comparisons of “most differ-
ent” female and male candidates. Examining candidates from Chile and 
Brazil allow me to maximize difference in the conventional predictors of 
campaign strategies: Party ideology and country culture. Women demo-
cratically won the presidency for the first time in 2006 and 2010, respec-
tively. Other women ran unsuccessful, but viable, campaigns during 
these same elections. I base the analysis on about 1,000 newspaper arti-
cles covering these elections, as well as the ones immediately preceding 
them.  
I found that “most different” female candidates strategically sought 
to cultivate a core constituency of women on the basis of gender identity 
by employing three common tactics: They met with women early on in 
their campaigns; evoked gendered experiences as mothers or victims of 
sexism to establish a shared identity with female voters; and leveraged 
these shared identities to more credibly promise pro-women reforms. I 
also found that “most different” male candidates rarely sought to target 
women on the basis of gender identity, but they seemed to do so more 
often when competing against viable female candidates. In contrast to 
their female competitors, male candidates often tried to mobilize female 
voters by recruiting spouses or prominent women from their parties, 
who were then responsible for talking about gender issues and deflecting 
accusations of sexism.  
Presidential campaigns are important determinants of the quality of 
political representation because this is when candidates make policy 
commitments and citizens more often tune in to political news (Boas 
2016). The theory of gender-strategic mobilization has multiple implica-
tions for women’s representation in Latin America, which is a topic of 
increasing scholarly interest (Schwindt-Bayer 2010, 2018). It suggests that 
the entry of viable female candidates, even if they lose, can at least draw 
more attention to issues affecting this historically marginalized group, 
such as maternal health, day care for young children, and gender discrim-
ination. Female candidates often seem to spur male candidates to raise 
the profile of women in their campaigns, possibly positioning them to 
serve as high-level appointees.  
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1 Gender and Campaigning in Latin  
America  
Dominant theories on campaigning in Latin America tend to focus on 
party systems and electioneering cultures. Classic theories from the latter 
category argue that historically salient social cleavages determine which 
groups’ parties will target and which campaign promises they will make 
(Dix 1989; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). According to these theories, candi-
dates make few attempts to mobilize women on the basis of gender 
identity because, unlike class and religion, gender is not a cleavage 
around which parties traditionally have organized themselves (Roberts 
2015).3 Luna’s (2014) argument that parties make segmented appeals to 
attract multiple social classes further extends the gender-blind partisan 
perspective. These theories expect that male and female candidates from 
the same parties will use similar tactics to target similar groups.  
A second line of research from Latin America analyzes electioneer-
ing cultures rather than parties. Boas (2016) argues that presidential can-
didates’ strategies will converge on the demonstrated success of previous 
presidential campaigns in the same country, regardless of party and ide-
ology. According to contagion theory, the most important differences in 
campaign appeals and styles will manifest themselves cross-nationally, 
and female presidential candidates will adopt the same strategies as those 
of winning campaigns led by males. 
Historical research on Latin America does suggest that gender has 
influenced how male leaders discursively shore up support. Kampwirth 
(2010) shows how male populists have leveraged shared understandings 
of masculinity and femininity to obtain power. Other research demon-
strates that organized women and female politicians have used maternal-
ism to broadly justify their political participation (Franceschet, Piscopo, 
and Thomas 2016; Miller 1991). However, this research has not ex-
plained how and why female presidential candidates might try to leverage 
their identities as mothers to specifically galvanize female voters and how 
male candidates might respond to this tactic. 
Research conducted outside the region has shown that whether 
candidates are female appears to affect the types of issues they empha-
size, the negativity of their tone, and how they portray themselves (Kahn 
1996). Some follow-up studies conclude that female and male candidates 
in the U.S. differ in terms of their issue focus, tone and style (Herrnson 
                                                 
3  Some women’s parties have formed in Latin America, but they have never been 
electorally viable.  
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and Lucas 2006; Panagopoulos 2004), but others have yielded null results 
(Bystrom and Kaid 2002; Dolan 2005). Finally, some scholars maintain 
that campaigning as women can boost women’s success rates (Herrnson 
2003). This suggests that female candidates often leverage their gender 
identity to their electoral advantage. 
The scholarship on how candidate gender affects campaign strate-
gies outside of Latin America generally focuses on legislative or sub-
national races. Yet, studies of female candidates for chief executive offic-
es worldwide have examined determinants of women’s successes and 
failures, rather than their campaign strategies (Adams 2016; Murray 2010; 
Thomas and Adams 2010; Valenzuela and Correa 2009). This research 
emphasizes how double binds, sexist expectations, and the media’s pro-
male bias often impede women’s chances for success.  
This article alternatively seeks to understand how presidential can-
didates’ gender leads to differences in how they seek to mobilize a histor-
ically marginalized but electorally lucrative group: women. Results from 
modeling the Latin American Public Opinion Project data shows that 
female voters are statistically more likely to say that they voted for a 
female presidential candidate. Morgan (2015) explains this relationship 
by suggesting that female voters believe female presidents are more likely 
to act on their behalf. However, scholars have yet to unpack this black 
box between presidential candidates’ gender and female support. This 
study confronts this challenge by digging deep into presidential cam-
paigns to see if women running for president in Latin America target 
female voters on the basis of gender identity, or if, as conventional theo-
ries would predict, female candidates largely campaign in ways similar to 
their male counterparts from the same party or country.  
2 A Theory of Gender-Strategic Mobilization  
It is a well-established assumption that viable presidential candidates seek 
the most efficient, effective way to earn popular support. Literature on 
constituencies shows that candidates tend to go after potential loyalists 
or core voters, rather than swing voters, early in their campaigns, (Cox 
2010; Cox and McCubbins 1986; Kriner and Reeves 2015). Candidates’ 
own social characteristics influence which groups they perceive as poten-
tial core constituencies (Fenno 1978). 
Following this, I posit that political elites in Latin America tend to 
believe that shared gender identity can generate trust and, eventually, 
votes. Women are thought to be more effective and efficient than men at 
mobilizing female voters specifically on the basis of gender identity. For 
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the purposes of this study, strategic mobilization of female voters on the 
basis of gender identity involves three specific tactics: (1) Meeting with 
groups of women; (2) evoking women’s multiple gendered identities; and 
(3) promising pro-women change.  
Why might political elites believe that female candidates enjoy a 
comparative advantage over their male counterparts in employing each 
of these tactics? First, female candidates are more likely than male candi-
dates to have affinities with both unorganized and organized women. 
Female candidates will likely network more with women, due to the 
sociological principle of gender homophily (McPherson and Smith-Lovin 
1986). Organized women’s and feminist groups prefer to see more wom-
en elected to political office, particularly the most powerful and histori-
cally male-dominated office of the presidency. Therefore, these groups 
are more likely to support female candidates than their male counter-
parts.  
Concerning the second tactic, any candidate – female or male – can 
evoke women’s gender identities, such as their identities as (potential) 
mothers or victims of sexism. Nevertheless, female candidates in Latin 
America almost always can reasonably claim shared gender identity with 
female voters by pointing to common experiences. For example, only 
female candidates can convincingly argue to have personally experienced 
motherhood or sexism, while male candidates almost never can. Female 
candidates therefore enjoy a credibility advantage in claiming to under-
stand challenges related to gender-specific roles and stereotypes.  
Regarding the final tactic, any candidate can promise pro-women 
change, but female candidates likely possess another credibility ad-
vantage. Having establishing shared gender identity, these women can 
then draw on notions of linked fate, or the idea that an individual’s des-
tiny depends in many ways on the destiny of their group. Female voters 
may trust female candidates more than their male counterparts to defend 
these interests because (in theory, but usually not in practice) all women 
would benefit. Therefore, female candidates are more likely to evoke 
shared identities with female voters and promise pro-women change in 
an effort to elicit trust and political support.  
All of the above reasons sustain the theory’s premise that political 
elites tend to believe that women are better at mobilizing women, specif-
ically on the basis of gender identity. I argue that this belief powerfully 
shapes female candidates’ strategies vis-à-vis female voters. In seeking 
the most effective way to galvanize popular support, female candidates 
are more likely to employ the three tactics specified above to target 
women on the basis of gender identity. 
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Candidates who dedicate significant attempts, rather than haphazard 
ones, to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity generally pursue 
this strategy by employing all three of these tactics. Timing also is im-
portant. Targeting women early on suggests that the candidate views 
female voters as a potential loyalist base, or core constituency. Candi-
dates who prioritize their female mobilization strategy – who I contend 
are more likely to be female than male – tend to employ these specific 
tactics at least several months before the election, or right when they 
jump into the race.  
The same belief concerning female candidates’ comparative ad-
vantage vis-à-vis female voters generates theoretical expectations for 
male candidates’ strategies. Overall, they are less likely to target women 
on the basis of gender identity, but when they do, they are more likely to 
use female surrogates to campaign on their behalf. These female surro-
gates could be the male candidates’ wives, co-partisan female politicians, 
or other well-known women. Some of the female surrogates’ specific 
tasks in mobilizing women on the basis of gender identity overlap with 
those of female candidates. Such tasks include: Meeting with groups of 
women, making gendered appeals to female voters, and promoting the 
male candidates’ pro-women promises. At other times, how these surro-
gates, particularly female campaign managers or spokeswomen, are sup-
posed to attract female voters remains ambiguous. The implication is 
that a female face is deemed sufficient. Male candidates are also more 
likely to target women when they are campaigning against a female can-
didate, sometimes because they fear that the female candidate will siphon 
off women from their own core constituencies, which may be mobilized 
on the basis of class or religion. Female surrogates in these situations 
may also be tasked with criticizing the female candidate.  
3 “Most Different” Case Comparisons  
This study seeks to inductively generate the theory of gender-strategic 
mobilization, rather than definitively test it. To this end, I will leverage a 
series of purposefully selected case comparisons (Gerring 2007; Tarrow 
2010). The primary unit of analysis is the presidential campaign: Either a 
female or male candidacy beginning about one year before the election. 
The independent variable of interest is candidates’ identities as men or 
women, and the dependent variable is the way, and extent to which, 
candidates target female voters.  
A “most different” case study design compares campaigns that vary 
in theoretically relevant ways, but manifest the same values on the de-
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pendent variable (Gerring 2007). Chile, Argentina, Costa Rica, and Brazil 
all democratically elected female presidents from 2006 to 2010. Of these 
countries, Chile and Brazil allow the most variation in the independent 
variable of candidates’ gender, as well as other theoretically salient fac-
tors specifically campaign cultures and party ideologies.4 Beginning with 
the former, Chilean campaigns tend toward personalism and emotion, 
with presidential candidates emphasizing direct linkages with voters and 
mentioning few concrete proposals (Boas 2016). Brazilian campaigns 
tend to be more technocratic and policy-focused, with candidates por-
traying themselves as results-oriented executives. Concerning party ideo-
logies, I compared candidates who were “most different” in terms of the 
social (rather than economic) dimension of ideology, categorized as ei-
ther progressive or conservative. Social progressives tend to advocate for 
greater individual freedom in terms of gender, while social conservatives 
generally promote traditional gender roles. 
The empirical analysis includes all viable presidential campaigns for 
those elections that women won for the first time in Chile (2005–2006) 
and Brazil (2010), as well as the immediately preceding elections. Candi-
dates are considered viable if they were perceived at some point in the 
campaigns as potentially advancing to the second round. Table 1 lists the 
presidential campaigns included in this study. Four women and six men 
ran competitive campaigns in these countries Joaquín Lavín campaigned 
twice, so he appears twice in the table, making a total of 11 campaigns.  
Table 1. Presidential Campaigns 
Country Election 
Year 
Viable Male Candi-
dates 
Viable Female Candi-
dates 
Chile 1999–2000 Ricardo Lagos*;  
Joaquín Lavín  
None 
Chile 2005–2006 Joaquín Lavín;  
Sebastián Piñera  
Soledad Alvear;  
Michelle Bachelet* 
Brazil 2006 Lula da Silva*;  
Geraldo Alckmin  
None 
Brazil  2010 José Serra Marina da Silva;  
Dilma Rousseff* 
Note:  * Winner. 
                                                 
4  Elisa Carrió in Argentina ran against Cristian Fernández de Kirchner in 2007, 
but she maintained a similar center-left ideology as Fernández. Laura Chinchilla 
ran the only viable female campaign in Costa Rica during this period (Reyes-
Housholder and Thomas 2018).  
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Following “most different” logic, I sought to maximize variation on the 
variables of culture and ideology, which were not the study’s main focus, 
while holding constant the independent variable of interest, candidate 
gender. Therefore, I could separately analyze the “most different” female 
and “most different” male candidates. Table 2 categorizes the same can-
didates from Table 1 according to the explanatory variables of gender, 
country, and ideology. Gender was also the main independent variable of 
interest for Table 2.  
The first two rows of Table 2 show that female candidates within 
each country ideologically differed. Michelle Bachelet and Dilma 
Rousseff’s social ideologies are classified as progressive. The Socialist 
Party (PS) and Party for Democracy (PPD) were Bachelet’s strongest 
supporters, and the Workers’ Party (PT) provided Rousseff’s strongest 
support. These socially progressive parties have sometimes challenged 
traditional norms (Kitschelt et al. 2010).  
Table 2. “Most Different” Female and Male Candidates 
 Country Social Progressives Social Conservatives 
Female Can-
didates 
Chile Bachelet (PS) Alvear (DC) 
Brazil Rousseff (PT) Silva (PV) 
    
Male Candi-
dates 
Chile Lagos (PS) Lavín (UDI),  Piñera (RN) 
Brazil Lula (PT) Alckmin (PSDB),  Serra (PSDB) 
 
Soledad Alvear and Marina Silva represent social conservatives, as shown 
in the right-hand columns. Alvear was backed by the conservative Chris-
tian Democrats (DC), which has historically balked at advancing issues 
important to women’s interests (Ríos Tobar 2009). Although the Green 
Party (PV) is considered progressive on other dimensions, Marina Silva 
qualifies as a social conservative, primarily because of her affiliation with 
evangelical churches, which tend to espouse traditional gender roles in 
Brazil.5 Therefore, the female candidates paired on the cross-diagonals 
qualify as “most different”. Bachelet vs. Silva, and Rousseff vs. Alvear 
vary in terms of ideology and culture, as well as their success at winning 
the presidency. Finding that these diverse female candidates displayed 
                                                 
5  Silva has often advocated for greater state intervention, particularly in environ-
mental issues, so might be considered more left-leaning on other ideological 
dimensions. 
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common female-mobilization strategies will further strengthen my argu-
ment’s external validity.  
The bottom two rows of Table 2 show the viable male candidates 
selected for this study. Starting with the socially progressive candidates, 
Ricardo Lagos hailed from the Socialist Party (PS), and Lula led the 
Worker’s Party (PT). Concerning the socially conservative candidates, 
Lavín represented the far right Independent Democratic Union (UDI) 
party, which has historically embraced social conservatism. Sebastián 
Piñera, subscribing to the National Renovation (RN) party, has also 
expressed socially conservative views. Finally, the ideological heterogene-
ity of Brazil’s Social Democratic Party (PSDB) complicates classifying 
Geraldo Alckmin and José Serra (Samuels and Zucco 2014). I catego-
rized them as conservatives because both campaigned to maintain the 
status quo on reproductive rights, rather than liberalizing Brazil’s abor-
tion ban. 
Therefore, the “most different” male candidates were again located 
on the cross-diagonals of Table 2’s bottom rows. Of these candidates, 
the socially progressive Lula, who won in Brazil, appears “most differ-
ent” when paired with either Lavín or Piñera, who both lost in Chile. 
The socially progressive Lagos who won in Chile is “most different” 
when paired with either Alckmin or Serra who lost in Brazil.6 
Although many campaign studies examined advertisements, I used 
media reports to observe how candidates targeted female voters. Despite 
their sexist bias, these reports document campaign events, and speech 
excerpts, as well as interviews with candidates, advisors, and analysts. I 
specifically examined national newspapers because political analysis, one-
on-one interviews, and special reports in newspapers often provide 
greater in-depth coverage than those from television or radio. 
For the Chilean analyses, I examined the first and third most read 
newspapers, La Tercera and El Mercurio. I did not examine the sensation-
alist newspaper La Cuarta, which ranks second, as it offers less reliable 
coverage. The Biblioteca Nacional in Santiago features complete collections 
of these newspapers in microfilm, paper and electronic archives. I also 
examined two of the most widely circulated newspapers in Brazil – O 
                                                 
6  The way these candidates emerged as presidential contenders did not seem to 
consistently vary along gendered lines. All candidates had significant political 
experience as ministers, governors, mayors, or legislators. None were outsiders, 
with the partial exception of Silva, who nevertheless had served as a minister in 
the Lula administration. Lula was the only candidate running for re-election, 
and one of the men (Lagos) and two other women (Bachelet, Rousseff) ran as 
incumbent party candidates.  
  Women Mobilizing Women 79
 

 
Globo and Folha de São Paulo. Representing Brazil’s largest cities (Rio de 
Janeiro and São Paulo), these publications offer the most comprehensive 
national coverage of presidential campaigns.7 Proquest houses a com-
plete online database of these newspapers.  
After collecting more than 1,000 articles,8 I then reviewed them in 
chronological order to understand sequence of events. I was particularly 
interested in understanding which tactics (if any) candidates used to 
target women before, during, and at the end of the official campaign 
season. I looked for any evidence related to the candidates’ electoral 
strategies, public images, and promises. My focus was not on the effec-
tiveness of the campaigns vis-à-vis women, but rather on the candidates’ 
specific tactics.  
4 Female Candidates Mobilizing Women on 
the Basis of Gender Identity  
Viable female candidates in Chile and Brazil targeted women on the basis 
of gender identity early on, and many times, throughout their campaigns. 
Their specific tactics revealed a similar pattern. First, these female candi-
dates met with groups of women months before the election, suggesting 
they believed female voters could coalesce into a base of loyalist support, 
or a core constituency. Second, they tried to establish common identities 
with women by evoking gender-specific experiences, most prominently 
motherhood and sexism. Third, they also aimed to earn women’s votes 
by promising pro-women change. Although Bachelet vs. Silva, and 
Rousseff vs. Alvear constitute the “most different” pairings, I analyzed 
their campaigns in rough chronological order and by country, beginning 
with Chile.  
4.1 Meeting with Female Voters  
As Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alvear led the polls until 2004. In July , 
more than a year before the election, she visited the town of Doñihue to 
meet with female artisans. An El Mercurio journalist captured the sense of 
                                                 
7  Some evidence came from Valor Econômico, another reputable national newspa-
per that focuses on economics and politics. 
8  I conducted keyword searches for the period from January to November of 
2006 and 2010. Keywords included “mulher*” (woman/women), “campanha,” 
(campaign) “presiden*” (president/presidential) and “eleitorado feminino” (female 
electorate), as well as the candidates’ names. 
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excitement among women waiting for the minister to arrive. “At least in 
this town, we perceived ‘feminine strength’ (fuerza femenina). Almost 
spontaneously there emerged among those present a kind of pride for 
having a woman occupy a ministerial position and moreover for the 
possibility of having a presidenta,” the journalist wrote. “We are going to 
vote for a woman, that is clear,” said one of the female town-dwellers 
(Lagos V. 2004). That same year, Alvear participated in a program for 
low-income families at a school in Santiago (Marré V. 2004). She ap-
peared at the school’s gym, where hundreds of women were waiting to 
see her, and Chilean news reported that she seemed exceptionally skilled 
when interacting with women (Lagos V. 2004). 
As Health and then Defense Minister, Bachelet eventually became 
even better known than Alvear for her success in rallying women behind 
her presidential candidacy (Ríos Tobar 2008). Similar to Alvear, she be-
gan targeting female voters more than a year before the official campaign 
season. In April 2004, she met with Puente de Chile Solidario program ben-
eficiaries, many of whom were single mothers (Marré V. 2004). In visit-
ing the El Arenal sector, she sought to build a loyalist base of mostly 
unorganized female voters.  
Both Silva’s and Rousseff’s efforts to target women in Brazil early in 
the race were notable, since women historically were not core constitu-
encies of the PV or the PT. Eager to become a more electorally competi-
tive party, Silva’s team was enthusiastic about her perceived potential 
among female voters. “Marina has good access to poor women, a seg-
ment which the PV has never dreamed of getting close to,” said Alfredo 
Sirkis, general coordinator of her pre-campaign. “They identify with her” 
(Folha De S. Paulo 2010a). Polls suggesting the ability of this former sena-
tor and minister to grow among female voters reportedly motivated her 
efforts to reach out to women early in 2010. She met with Green Party 
women and female leaders from the Federation of Rural Workers of the 
State of São Paulo in March 2010, several months before the official 
campaign season (Delgado 2010a; Ribeiro 2010; Scolese 2010). She 
scheduled another event with female rural workers the following month 
(Delgado 2010b). 
As Lula’s chief of staff, Rousseff similarly sought to energize and 
broaden her party’s female base by interacting with female union work-
ers in São Paulo, a historic stronghold of the Workers’ Party (Delgado 
2010c). Rousseff and Lula opened the Second Women’s Metalworker 
Congress of ABC together at the end of March 2010. She clearly sought 
to generate enthusiasm among women from the left by personally meet-
ing with them early in the electoral contest. 
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4.2 Evoking Gender Identities  
In addition to interacting with female voters, female candidates repeated-
ly evoked women’s gender identities, particularly their identities as (po-
tential) mothers and victims of sexism. Both candidates in Chile high-
lighted their identities as mothers to cultivate their support more than a 
year before the election. Alvear spoke in detail about her children to 
directly relate to female artisans in Doñihue. 
I am always connected. I know exactly the day that one has a test 
or a job interview […] Gutenberg is very well, in the fourth year 
of civil engineering at the Universidad Católica. He is a spectacular 
son, supportive and a very good brother. Maybe one of the 
strengths that is generated with a working mother is the link 
among the siblings. (Lagos V. 2004) 
Alvear added that she would not become a grandmother soon because 
her oldest married daughter was finishing her PhD. “There are so many 
hours of studying, and maternity is not yet in her plans. Thanks to email, 
we are in contact various times a day” (Lagos V. 2004). Alvear therefore 
seemed to strategically discuss her life as a working mother to establish 
shared identity with the female artisans with whom she was personally 
interacting.  
While Alvear sought to come off as easily balancing her profession-
al and family responsibilities as a married mother, Bachelet candidly 
related her struggles as a divorced mother, which enabled her to relate to 
other single working mothers:  
I spend very little time with her and with my two older children, 
who are 20 and 25. I suppose I’m calm about it, because I feel that 
they’ve been educated on solid bases. With my youngest girl it 
hurts when she gets angry with me for how little we see each oth-
er, and when I get the impression that she doesn’t need me, that 
she’s learned to live without me. That’s something I hate. The 
help that my mother’s provided has been fundamental. When one 
works and is separated, the presence of another adult is crucial. 
[…] I will try to protect my loved ones, so that they aren’t hurt 
because their mother is a public figure. (The Santiago Times 2004)  
Although Rousseff was also a single mother, she took an alternative, 
sometimes more figurative approach in leveraging her maternal identity. 
She vowed to care for the Brazilian people and use a maternal leadership 
style to get results (faz cobranças). “I am like a mother,” Rousseff said.  
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Mothers order (their children) to brush their teeth or do house-
hold chores. In the government, I was a kind of mother. I en-
forced deadlines but I gave support […] I am firm, but I take care. 
I protect. (Scolese and Rocha 2010) 
Folha interpreted these remarks as strategically targeting female voters. 
Rousseff also seized opportunities, such as holidays, to symbolically 
evoke her motherhood. Surrounded by women, she broached the prob-
lem of crack cocaine in a television appearance on Mother’s Day. This 
issue was thought to interest mothers because it especially affected Bra-
zilian youth (Fraga 2010). Rousseff claimed to share the concerns of 
many mothers. “We are going to conquer this fight, and we mothers are 
going to be on the front lines,” she declared (Fraga 2010). 
In addition to motherhood, female candidates can establish shared 
identity with women by celebrating advances in gender equality and 
relating experiences with sexism. Both Alvear and Bachelet symbolically 
promoted women’s political progress while meeting Chilean citizens 
during the government’s 2004 celebration of International Women’s Day 
(Salinas 2004). The slogan for the celebrations was “And why not? Chile 
needs women’s power (fuerza de la mujer).” On a separate occasion, Bach-
elet shared an example of gender discrimination with female voters. For 
some political leaders the fact that she and Alvear were performing well 
in the polls for the presidency was considered “a traffic accident; some-
thing unexpected that the women did not know how to handle” (Marré 
V. 2004). Retelling a personal story of sexism was a way for her to direct-
ly relate to female constituents who may have personally experienced 
machismo.  
Like Alvear and Bachelet, part of Silva’s female mobilization strate-
gy involved citing her own struggles against sexism. She discussed in a 
television interview how she overcame gender prejudice in deciding to 
leave her rural hometown and study at the university (Delgado 2010b). 
Another common tactic female candidates in Brazil used was a first-
female discursive frame to evoke shared gender identities. Such framing 
emphasized the possibility of electing a woman to the presidency for the 
first time in national history, marking a victory for all women. High-
profile politicians endorsed Rousseff by drawing on shared gender iden-
tity and linked fate (O Globo 2010a). One female PT senator declared: “I 
believe that every woman in this country is going to feel like the Presi-
dent of the Republic with a woman in the presidency” (Ceolin and 
Ramalho 2010). In other words, a victory for a first-time presidenta would 
benefit all Brazilian women. 
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Female candidates often leveraged women’s multiple identities. For 
example, Bachelet’s final comments during a presidential debate hinged 
on her identities as a middle-class single mother, female doctor, and 
potential victim of sexism:  
The first thing is that I am a woman of the middle class. I am a 
woman and moreover now I am a single mother and I have 
worked my whole life. […] I go shopping at the supermarket, I go 
to leave my daughter at school, that is to say, effectively, I am a 
professional, I had opportunities to study and that is why I have 
been able to be a female doctor and have a dignified life […] I 
know that as a woman, people are going to be looking at me 
through a magnifying glass to see if I am doing it well or not, and 
I have a tremendous responsibility, not just with the people who 
vote for me, with those who believe in me, but also with the 
women of this country, to demonstrate also that women can do it 
[…]. (Archivo Chile 2005) 
Bachelet’s remarks began with her status as a woman and then layered 
on other gendered identities. She talked about her everyday activities as a 
middle-class mother and her career as a female doctor. She finally 
acknowledged that, as a female politician, she expected greater scrutiny 
than her male competitors. This alluded to double standards, which is a 
classic manifestation of sexism. In short, Bachelet seized a high-stakes 
opportunity to sell her candidacy to the Chilean public by evoking multi-
ple gendered identities. 
As a black, evangelical woman who grew up in abject poverty, Silva 
also strategically deployed her intersecting identities to elicit the trust and 
political support of specific subsets of women. Folha reported in March 
2010 that the Green Party candidate was ready to target three (often 
overlapping) demographics: Women, Christians, and the lower classes 
(Delgado 2010d). Silva’s campaign manager confirmed that her candida-
cy presented potential for growth among poor women (Folha De S. Paulo 
2010a). The Green Party reportedly had crafted a strategy to target popu-
lar sectors by stressing her impoverished childhood and evangelical faith. 
Her pre-campaign coordinators remarked that these sectors had been 
difficult to capture in previous elections, but they predicted that Silva 
could perform better among these groups thanks to commonly held 
social identities.  
Silva’s religious affiliation thereby motivated and shaped her target-
ing of not only low-income women, but also socially conservative wom-
en (O Globo 2010b). In August 2010, campaign coordinators reportedly 
hoped that their candidate would lure away support from poor women 
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who seemed to back Rousseff or Serra. Silva and her team designed 
television advertisements featuring her biography as an impoverished 
black woman from the Northern state of Acre (Roxo 2010). According 
to O Globo, Green Party advisers expected Silva’s life story to elicit empa-
thy from lower class women, who had identified with President Lula in 
the past.  
A final way that female candidates leverage their shared identities 
with female voters is by emphasizing positively valued qualities that they 
claim universally characterize women, such as their capacity to serve as 
inclusive, consensus-seeking leaders.9 This tactic of affirmatively essen-
tializing women’s identities, or claiming that all women possess similar 
traits, serves at least three distinct purposes. First, it unites women be-
hind a shared, favorable identity. Second, it reinforces commonalities 
between the female candidate and female constituents. Third, it helps 
justify greater participation for women in the historically male-dominated 
executive branch.  
One example of this positive essentialization for electoral gain oc-
curred during a high-profile Sabatina Folha interview in June 2010. Silva 
was asked about the significance of a female president potentially gov-
erning the country. She responded: “Women are more inclusive. They 
have more negotiation ability. They tend much more to consensus than 
to disputes” (Folha De S. Paulo 2010b). Generalizations such as these 
assume that all women possess a comparative advantage in leadership 
and were designed to unite women behind Silva’s candidacy. At the same 
time, these generalizations give more reasons to elect a female president, 
rather than a male one. Rousseff deployed a similar tactic at an event to 
galvanize female metallurgical workers. She emphasized women’s leader-
ship competence, affirming that women are “capable of making deci-
sions, of directing, of being good leaders and constructing an environ-
ment of understanding and comprehension” (Delgado 2010c).  
4.3 Promising Pro-Women Change  
A final way that female presidential candidates in Chile and Brazil at-
tempted to mobilize women on the basis of gender identity is by promis-
ing change benefitting women. In Chile, early childhood education was 
one of the most prominent pro-women promises in Bachelet’s platform: 
“We will implement a system of childhood protection destined to equal 
opportunities for the development of Chilean children in their first eight 
                                                 
9  This study is agnostic as to whether women possess such qualities, but rather 
focuses on the discursive use of these claims. 
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years of life” (Bachelet 2005: 13).10 She specifically pledged to “guarantee 
kindergarten access to all children.” Preschools would enable mothers 
with small children to work outside the home, thereby targeting this 
subset of women. 
Similarly catering to (potential) mothers in Brazil, Rousseff’s signa-
ture pro-women proposals focused on pregnant women’s health and 
infant care (Suwwan 2010). She pledged to expand public services for 
these women and their babies by establishing specialized clinics, new 
maternities, intensive care services, and emergency ambulances. “We are 
going to articulate this network to the SAMU-Stork so that women do 
not stay here, having children in the middle of the street,” she an-
nounced.  
In addition to that, the SAMU (emergency ambulances) with mini-
intensive care babies, so that children that are born and run risks 
in the first months of life can be transported with security. (Suw-
wan 2010) 
She also promised to improve state childcare. “We have a very important 
thing in the PAC 2 for women and their children. We are going to con-
struct crèches” (Delgado 2010c). She then defended proposals to extend 
maternity leaves.  
Female candidates, who have emphasized their experiences as im-
poverished women, rather than as mothers, may make pro-women 
promises that target this subgroup of women. For example, Silva prom-
ised to improve existing programs for low-income women. “The housing 
deficit is very serious,” she said during a presidential debate.  
In the last 16 years, investment for the poorest families left some-
thing to be desired. The program Minha Casa Minha Vida is very 
good, but it does not reach the population that earns up to two 
minimum wages. We are going to maintain this program and give 
it a new quality, so that it reaches even poor women. (O Globo 
2010c) 
  
                                                 
10  Due to low polling numbers, Alvear dropped out of the race before her coali-
tion’s primaries. She never widely distributed a formal platform, as candidates 
generally do so toward the middle and end of the official campaign season. 
Therefore, I found very little documentation of Alvear’s campaign pledges. 
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5 Male Candidates’ Female Surrogate  
Strategy 
Men running for the presidency in Chile and Brazil from 2000–2010 
targeted female voters less overall, and when they did, they employed 
different strategies than those of their female opponents. I found little 
evidence of viable male candidates targeting women on the basis of gen-
der identity early on in their campaigns. However, each male candidate 
used a female surrogate to court female voters, particularly if they cam-
paigned against a viable female candidate. The analysis moreover reveals 
that their female surrogates were assigned to assigned to three tasks, 
which overlap with the those of the female candidates described above: 
meeting with groups of female voters, evoking gender identities in 
speeches and interviews, and promoting the male candidates’ pro-
women promises.  
Male candidates campaigning against women often delegated a 
fourth task to their female surrogates – deflecting accusations of sexism 
and criticizing the female candidate. Since women are more often viewed 
as victims of gender discrimination then are men, male candidates some-
times worry that they will be perceived as sexist or taking advantage of 
gender stereotypes to the detriment of the female candidates. To better 
react to machismo accusations or pre-empt them, male candidates deploy 
their female surrogates to defend the male candidates and attack the 
female opponent. The evidence suggests that female surrogates focus on 
only one or two of these tasks. As with the analysis of female-led cam-
paigns, I reviewed the male-led campaigns in rough chronological order, 
beginning with Chile.  
Male candidates in the 1999–2000 campaigns employed a female-
surrogate strategy to mobilize women during the second round of cam-
paigning to either compensate for their weakness (in the case of Lagos) 
or to expand one of their core constituencies (in the case of Lavín). La-
gos’ team believed that women constituted his Achilles’ heel, so they 
would be an important group to target (Arriagada and Navia 2005).11 He 
responded by naming then-Justice Minister Alvear as his spokesperson 
just two days after the first round of campaigning. 
Former mayor Lavín looked to counterbalance Lagos’ female cam-
paign manager and solidify his core constituency of women by deploying 
his wife, María Estela de León. She made her first official campaign 
                                                 
11  Alvear’s female mobilization tasks were not specified in the Chilean press, 
possibly suggesting that merely a female face was deemed sufficient. 
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speech to more than 4,000 women at the Cultural House of Santiago’s 
Ñuñoa neighborhood (El Mercurio 4 1999). She later initiated a parallel 
campaign with her children, as a way to court female voters (El Mercurio 
Online 1999).  
Facing female competition in the next elections, Lavín seemed even 
more concerned with maintaining his constituency of low-income wom-
en. He appeared to expand his female surrogate strategy in an attempt to 
counter-balance Bachelet, whose growing popularity among women was 
viewed as a threat to his female base (Errázuriz L. 2004).12 One of 
Lavín’s advisors said that naming a female campaign manager would 
“break with the axis of the 2005 presidential election that it is a matter of 
gender, that is to say, that they will have to choose between a man and a 
woman” (Errázuriz L. 2004). After considering other female politicians 
from the right,13 Lavín tapped Cristina Bitar as his generalísima (Aránguiz 
2005). Analysts noted that one of her assets was that, at the age of 35, 
she was a young woman, suggesting that these dual identities could help 
capture both young and female voters (El Mostrador 2005). 
Lavín was not the only male candidate worried about Bachelet’s 
popularity among women. El Mercurio predicted in October 2005 that, 
regardless of whether Lavín or Piñera advanced to the second round, 
either candidate would likely use female surrogates since “a female face is 
essential to compete against Bachelet” (Aravena Bolívar 2005). Billion-
aire businessman and former senator Piñera focused on competing 
against Lavín until the first round on 11 December 2005, which elimi-
nated his conservative, intra-coalition rival.14 Piñera and his team then 
adjusted their strategy to defeat Bachelet.  
A main plank of this renewed strategy was to counterbalance Bach-
elet with female surrogates. To this end, Piñera invited RN Deputy Lily 
Pérez to serve as his campaign manager. She also assumed responsibili-
ties of rallying female voters. Piñera’s wife also served as a female surro-
gate, meeting with groups of women at the end of December 2005 
(Campusano S. 2005).  
                                                 
12  Lavín also sought to erode Bachelet’s advantage by suggesting that she was, in 
effect, playing the female card. He commented: “She beats me because she is a 
woman” (Durán 2005). His advisers believed these statements helped “make 
explicit that Bachelet’s support is artificial and that women back her because of 
gender” (Durán 2005). 
13  Concepción’s mayor, Jacqueline Van Rysselberghe, was considered a potentially 
good pick in May 2004, since she was recently named vice president of the 
UDI (Errázuriz L. 2004).  
14  Lavín earned 23.2 percent of the vote, while Piñera advanced to the second 
round with 25.4 percent. 
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Male candidates competing in the 2006 Brazilian race displayed sim-
ilar patterns as those of their male counterparts in Chile. Although they 
rarely targeted women on the basis of gender identity, both Lula and his 
main opponent Geraldo Alckmin, former governor of São Paulo and 
PSDB president, used female surrogates to attract female voters in 2006. 
In October of that year (relatively late in the campaign), Lula’s wife, 
Marisa Letícia and the wife of his vice-presidential pick, Mariza Alencar, 
led a women’s march with about 500 female party members and ministe-
rial workers through a mall in the capital of Brasília (Folha De S. Paulo 
2006; O Globo 2006; Lima 2006). Women from Lula’s re-election team 
had organized the event, and another march in the Federal District was 
scheduled to take place a few days later. 
In addition to Letícia and Alencar, Lula employed São Paulo’s for-
mer mayor and one of his campaign coordinators, Marta Suplicy, to 
target female voters on his behalf in 2006 (Teodoro 2006). Suplicy dedi-
cated her Oct. 21st agenda to targeting women and people living in the 
northeastern part of the country. She was scheduled to participate in a 
march in Santo André in São Paulo’s ABC district that morning, along 
with Letícia and Alencar (Paulo 2006). Finally, Alckmin’s wife, “Dona 
Lu,” played a comparable surrogate role (Bautzer 2006). The PSDB’s 
women’s section of Maranhão organized a march in October 2006 
through the center of São Luís, where she greeted female voters.  
Campaigning against two viable female candidates in 2010, former 
governor of São Paulo José Serra deployed his wife, Mônica Serra, as his 
surrogate to counterbalance with Rousseff, who was leading in the polls. 
“The PSDB’s idea is to make Mônica the counterpoint to Dilma – that 
exploits the fact of being a woman in her campaign,” Folha reported 
(Guerreiro and do Valle 2010). Mônica Serra met with PSDB women at 
the beginning of August 2010. She also scheduled time with women’s 
groups in Ceará, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraíba and Pernambuco, and 
campaigned alongside Fernanda Richa, wife of the PSDB’s candidate for 
Paraná’s governorship. 
Similar to the female candidates themselves, female surrogates cam-
paigning on behalf of male candidates often evoked shared identities as 
women to establish trust with female voters. They also sought to pro-
mote male candidates’ pro-women reforms. For example, Lavín’s wife, 
María Estela León, “is the typical Chilean woman,” according to one 
leader in the Lavín camp,  
She is a housewife; she has lots of kids; she is strong-willed (tiene 
empuje), and her physical appearance is typically Chilean. According 
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to our studies, the female sex feels very identified with her. (La 
Tercera 6 1999a) 
Seeking to leverage her perceived comparative advantage, León evoked 
maternal themes during her first campaign speech in Santiago (El Mercu-
rio 4 1999). A mother of seven, she once was asked to explain Lavín’s 
exceptional performance among female voters: 
I believe that women always think about their children. They are 
always concerned about their ‘puppies’ and what they want is 
work for their husband, or for themselves to maintain their chil-
dren, so that they are raised well and have the possibility to go to 
the doctor. They look over the well-being of their family and they 
have seen in Joaquín a person that has done many concrete things. 
Women are not guided by ideologies, but more by the feelings of 
who gives them the most security. (El Mercurio 4 1999) 
León first defined women according to their roles as mothers and wives, 
and then implied that women were concerned with concrete, everyday 
issues, a focal point of her husband’s campaign. She also characterized 
women’s decision-making as intuitive and guided by their emotions, 
rather than political ideas. León moreover made essentialist claims con-
cerning women’s identities and interests. Given her own identity as a 
woman, mother and wife, León seemed to believe she possessed the 
authority to speak on behalf of female voters. Her message: Trust me 
because I also am a woman.  
Female surrogates in Brazil also sought to mobilize female voters by 
drawing on shared gender identity. For example, at the end of the 2006 
Women’s March, Mariza Alencar shouted: “I make a special appeal to 
women miners and also to all Brazilian women” (O Globo 2006). Later 
that month, Letícia gave her first televised speech during Lula’s advertis-
ing time. Her appearance ran on the night dedicated to Lula’s pro-
women achievements, including the creation of the women’s ministry 
(Teodoro 2006). “He has worked so much in favor of Brazilian women,” 
Letícia said. “And this work is going to grow even more in the next four 
years. Palavra da mulher (women’s word).” Here, Letícia re-appropriated 
the more common, patriarchal phrase palavra de homem (men’s word) to 
emphasize that women can trust her word because she is a woman. 
Because women are thought to be more credible at promising pro-
women reforms, male candidates often delegated the task of promoting 
their pro-women proposals to their female surrogates. Supporting Serra, 
Serrano defended her party’s record on women’s issues by pointing to 
the pro-women achievements during the 1995–2003 administration of 
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co-partisan President Fernando Henrique Cardoso. She cited the crea-
tion of the Women’s Special Secretary and the fact that Cardoso’s condi-
tional cash-transfer programs directed maternal benefits to low-income 
women (Delgado 2010b). O Globo also reported that Serrano emphasized 
health issues to cultivate Serra’s female vote. “Women feel a lot of secu-
rity,” she said. 
They have a strong recollection of him as Health Minister and the 
general revolution that he did with the creation of Family Health. 
We have a very clear notion that health is an issue intimately 
linked to women who end up being responsible for taking care of 
the health of the parents, the children and the husband. (O Globo 
2010e) 
Finally, men vying for the presidency often used female surrogates to 
defend themselves and attack female opponents. Piñera worried about 
being perceived as sexist during the 2005–2006 campaigns, and Pérez 
became campaign spokesperson  
so that she be the one to confront Michelle Bachelet and therefore 
avoid that the criticisms and rebuttals that the Alianza candidate 
could dedicate would not be seen as an ‘act of machismo’. (Guerra 
2005) 
El Mercurio reported that the Alianza was concerned with the Bachelet 
camp’s allegations of sexism “because this could activate a spirit of soli-
darity among women” (Guerra 2005).  
In 2010, Serra enlisted his spouse to attack Rousseff. On the web 
site PSDB Mobilizes, Mônica Serra accused the female PT candidate of 
ignoring a controversy over Brazilian intervention in a stoning of an 
Iranian woman charged with infidelity. “And the woman candidate? She 
is mute. She doesn’t say anything” (Guerreiro and do Valle 2010). In 
order to downplay the significance of Rousseff’s gender identity, Mônica 
Serra later told reporters: “This is not a gender election. The gender issue 
is overcome.” Serra’s wife also accused the PT candidate of being “in 
favor of killing little children” because of her falsely alleged pro-choice 
stance (Cervellini, Giani, and Pavanelli 2011). Serra also used a high-
profile actress to attack Rousseff on television in October (O Globo 
2010d). In one of Serra’s commercials, the actress claimed that Rousseff 
called upon Lula every time a problem arose. In another pro-Serra adver-
tisement, the actress further criticized the future presidenta by reminding 
viewers of a scandal involving Rousseff’s right-hand female aide. 
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6 Conclusions on Candidate Gender,  
Presidential Campaigning and Women’s 
Representation in Latin America 
The recent rise of female presidential candidates brings greater attention 
to the incompleteness and inadequacies of dominant theories on presi-
dential campaigning in Latin America. They especially fall short of ex-
plaining how the entry of viable female candidates affects the extent, and 
ways in which, candidates compete for women’s support. This article 
systematically explains the mechanisms linking presidential candidates’ 
gender identities to the extent and ways in which they target female vot-
ers. The analyses empirically support the theory of gender-strategic mo-
bilization in showing how “most different” female candidates all used 
three tactics early on in the race: meeting with groups of women, evok-
ing gendered identities and promising pro-women change. The “most 
different” male candidates did not tend to prioritize targeting of female 
voters in these ways, but when they did – often responding to viable 
female candidates – they tended to delegate the tasks to female surro-
gates.  
Although party factors may still account for many aspects of presi-
dential campaigns, this study shines new light on how women running 
for president in Chile and Brazil often broke with their parties’ tradition-
al campaign tactics and the groups their parties traditionally targeted. 
With the exception of the DC, the parties of each of these female candi-
dates tended to perform better among women than men. The PS in 
Chile, and the PV and PT in Brazil all tended to attract more male than 
female voters (Hunter 2010; Lewis 2004). More specifically, although 
Lagos and Bachelet were from the same party in the same country, 
Bachelet made much earlier, and more consistent, attempts to mobilize 
women on the basis of gender identity. Lagos attempted this by using a 
female surrogate only at the very end of his 1999–2000 campaign. Lula 
and Rousseff were also from the same party in Brazil. Rousseff, howev-
er, made earlier and greater attempts than Lula to mobilize women on 
the basis of gender identity in 2010, which is consistent with this article’s 
theory. Lula used female surrogates, particularly his wife, to mobilize 
women on his behalf, as did other viable male candidates in Chile and 
Brazil. 
To conclude, the rise of competitive female presidential candidates 
might be considered an example of how the entry of groups representing 
historically marginalized interests, such as the emergence of class-based 
parties (Kitschelt et al. 2010; Roberts 2015), can deepen democracy by 
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diversifying the supply of campaign promises and voices. This study 
focuses on countries marked by growing dissatisfaction among citizens 
and perceived failures of the political class in channeling citizen de-
mands. While it is unrealistic to expect female candidates to solve such 
endemic problems, characteristic of “crises of representation” (Hagopian 
2016; Luna 2016), their candidacies could at least marginally help coun-
teract them by enhancing women’s political presence, as well as policy-
making on behalf of women (that is, women’s descriptive and substan-
tive representation). The recent entry of viable female candidates seems 
to motivate male candidates to raise the profiles of women in their cam-
paigns (thereby potentially enhancing descriptive representation). Some 
of these women, in turn, could find themselves better positioned to 
serve in ministerial or other high-level posts if their candidate wins. The 
emergence of competitive female candidates also seems to move their 
male competitors to focus more on crafting proposals to target this de-
mographic (thereby potentially improving substantive representation). 
Therefore, even if viable female candidates ultimately lose a presidential 
race, other female politicians, as well as female citizens, may reap auxilia-
ry benefits.  
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Mujeres movilizando mujeres: estrategias de candidatos para ga-
nar la Presidencia 
Resumen: América Latina ha elegido a más mujeres presidentas que 
cualquier otra región en el mundo, sin embargo, las teorías dominantes 
sobre las campañas tienden a ignorar el género. Al abordar esta brecha 
en la literatura, este artículo argumenta que la creencia generalizada de 
que las mujeres son mejores para movilizar a las mujeres hace que las 
candidatas mujeres tiendan a invertir esfuerzos más significativos en 
cultivar una base electoral de mujeres votantes sobre la base de la identi-
dad de género. Por el contrario, los candidatos hombres tienden a dele-
gar en mujeres sustitutas las tareas de movilización de mujeres. Un análi-
sis de aproximadamente 1,000 artículos de diarios revela que las candida-
tas más diferentes en Chile y Brasil se reunieron consistentemente con 
votantes mujeres al principio de sus campañas, evocaron identidades de 
género y prometieron cambios pro-mujer. Los candidatos hombres más 
diferentes alistaron a sus esposas y mujeres políticas para atacar a las 
candidatas mujeres, defender sus promesas de mujeres y desviar las acu-
saciones de sexismo. La teoría ilumina las múltiples formas en que la 
entrada de mujeres candidatas viables en la arena política puede mejorar 
la representación de las mujeres ciudadanas. 
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